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CLIMATE CHANGE, CORPORATE STRATEGY, AND 
CORPORATE LAW DUTIES 
Perry E. Wallace*
INTRODUCTION 
Although greenhouse-gas (“GHG”) management now ranks 
among the world’s great challenges, this status did not obtain 
instantly—or easily.  Today, however, reservations about the 
validity of global warming as a major threat are fading.1  They are 
fading, appropriately, as rapidly as some ice sheets and glaciers are 
melting.2  Indeed, the steady flow of new, compelling evidence joins 
an already considerable base of scientific, economic, and other 
certainties about the subject.3
The result of this evolution in climate-change certainty has been 
major change of global dimensions.  In notable ways, the structures 
and the functions of governmental, economic, and social institutions 
around the world are now being revised.  Moreover, these revisions 
typically derive from one model or another of a carbon-constrained 
planet.4
Corporations, because of their past and continuing roles in 
creating the problem, will be substantially affected by emerging 
market and regulatory cultures.  “The consequences [of these 
market and regulatory dynamics] are not confined to ‘obvious’ 
sectors such as power generation, transport and heavy industry; 
 *  Professor of Law, Washington College of Law at American University.  
Director, JD/MBA Dual Degree Program.  JD, Columbia University, 1975.  
B.Engr., Vanderbilt University, 1970. 
 1. UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, UNEP YEARBOOK 2009, at 21 
(Catherine McMullen & Thomas Hayden eds., 2009) (“Climate change has long 
since ceased to be a scientific curiosity . . . .  It is the major, overriding 
environmental issue of our time . . . .”). 
 2. See, e.g., Press Release, Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., Satellites 
Show Arctic Literally on Thin Ice (Apr. 6, 2009), http://www.nasa.gov 
/home/hqnews/2009/apr/HQ_09-079_Sea_ice_thins.html (“In recent years, Arctic 
sea ice has been declining at a surprising rate.”). 
 3. UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, supra note 1, at 22 (“[S]carcely a 
week passes without new research appearing in peer-reviewed literature and 
news reports that adds to the story.”). 
 4. See NICHOLAS STERN, U.K. TREASURY, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW (2007); see also EUR. COMM’N, EU ACTION AGAINST 
CLIMATE CHANGE: THE EUROPEAN CLIMATE CHANGE PROGRAMME (2006), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/pdf/eu_climate_change 
_progr.pdf (describing European Union actions to address climate change). 
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virtually every company’s activities, business models and strategies 
will need to be completely rethought.”5
This Article explores the question of whether corporate- and 
securities-law duties6 can (or will in the future) play a role in 
influencing the rapidly growing movement toward corporate 
strategic planning for GHG management.  Part I of the Article 
discusses corporate strategic-planning methodologies for GHG 
management.  This Part describes the basic features of corporate 
approaches to developing and implementing strategies, policies, and 
practices.  Important here are the risks, and also the opportunities, 
facing corporations and their stewards.  Part II then evaluates the 
potential applicability of corporate- and securities-law provisions 
that might appear to be implicated in climate-change corporate 
strategic planning and implementation. 
I.  STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR CORPORATE MANAGEMENT OF 
GREENHOUSE GASES 
A. Corporate Strategy Development for GHG Management: The 
Central Role of Risk 
Understanding the wisdom of timely action, some corporate 
leaders have developed their own strategies for GHG management, 
and certain common features are emerging.  One highly respected 
approach, for example, is the one set forth in Andrew J. Hoffman’s 
Carbon Strategies.7  Reflecting basic features common to other 
formulations, Carbon Strategies presents a road map consisting of 
three interactive stages that altogether comprise eight specific steps. 
“Stage One” of the method requires that the company develop a 
“climate strategy.”  This includes (1) assessing the emissions profile, 
(2) gauging risks and opportunities of GHG impacts, (3) evaluating 
action options for addressing these impacts, and (4) setting goals 
and targets.8  “Stage Two” of the method requires that the company 
focus inwardly by (1) developing financial mechanisms and (2) 
engaging the organization.9  “Stage Three” of the method requires 
that the company focus outwardly by (1) formulating policy 
strategies and (2) managing external relations.10
In the initial assessment, a company must ascertain whether a 
scientifically demonstrated general risk is in fact actual, or at least 
 5. Rory Sullivan, Introduction to CORPORATE RESPONSES TO CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2, 3 (Rory Sullivan ed., 2008); see also ANDREW J. HOFFMAN & JOHN G. 
WOODY, CLIMATE CHANGE: WHAT’S YOUR BUSINESS STRATEGY? 1 (2008). 
 6. The term “corporate law” will generally refer to both state corporate 
law and federal securities law, unless one particular body of law is expressly 
made the subject of discussion. 
 7. ANDREW J. HOFFMAN, CARBON STRATEGIES (2007). 
 8. Id. at 10–32. 
 9. Id. at 33–47. 
 10. Id. at 48–62. 
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imminent, and substantial as to that specific company.  Where the 
answer is in the affirmative, the company must then decide what to 
do.11  The following discussion focuses on specific material climate-
change risks posed for certain industries, based on available 
information and assessments. 
B. Specific Actual or Imminent Risks Facing Certain Industries: 
Opportunities and Competitive Advantage 
Of the various risks that attend climate change, physical, 
regulatory, and litigation risks are the most plausible candidates for 
potential applicability of the corporate and securities laws. 
1. Physical Risk 
Companies may face physical consequences of climate change.  
These include weather-related events such as increased storms, 
floods, droughts, strong winds, heat, forest fires, variations in water 
availability, and damage to vulnerable properties on coastlines.12
Such impacts create the potential for destruction of property, 
increased insurance premiums, asset devaluation, heat-related 
illnesses and diseases, enforced relocation, and increased commodity 
prices.  Affected companies would need to conduct thorough risk 
assessments as well as invoke adequate risk-management 
techniques and devices.13
2. Regulatory Risk 
Climate change is increasingly viewed as a serious market 
failure that requires government intervention.  These interventions 
may consist of (1) traditional measures (such as permit or energy-
efficiency requirements) or (2) market-based measures (such as 
carbon taxes, emissions-trading schemes, and fuel tariffs).14  
Ironically, what is clearer to most nonexperts than the validity of 
the science is the inevitability of regulation.  Nevertheless, this 
inevitability poses one threshold choice for companies: not whether 
to prepare, but when and how to prepare.  Indeed, the corporate-
strategy questions, because of the still-pervasive ignorance about 
climate change (not to mention political dynamics), are being driven 
 11. See id. at 10–32. 
 12. See Petition for Interpretive Guidance on Climate Risk Disclosure, No. 
4-547, at 7, 28–32 (Sept. 18, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/ 
petitions/2007/petn4-547.pdf [hereinafter SEC Petition]; Tom Walsh, Climate 
Change: Business Risks and Solutions, RISK ALERT,  Apr. 2006, at 1, 2–6, 
available at http://global.marsh.com/risk/climate/climate/documents 
/climateChange200604.pdf. 
 13. See Walsh, supra note 12, at 14–31. 
 14. See, e.g., Nathaniel O. Keohane et al., The Choice of Regulatory 
Instruments in Environmental Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 313–18 
(1998). 
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most by the spectre of comprehensive regulation.15
3. Litigation Risk 
With increased certainty about climate-change science and 
impacts, and with an expanding field of regulatory mandates, 
litigation is becoming more of a credible threat.  At the same time, 
the question of the risks created by climate-change litigation is 
complex.  Numerous variables render attempts at describing these 
risks a “precarious venture.”16  Nevertheless, litigation is a dynamic 
that corporate planners must include in their strategic-planning 
calculus. 
II.  CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAW 
A. Fiduciary-Duty Law 
Many environmental advocates now assert that substantial 
certainty about the climate-change threat imposes a “fiduciary duty” 
on corporate directors and officers to take aggressive ameliorative 
action.  The following discussion examines these contentions 
through the prism of Delaware case law. 
1. The Fiduciary Duty of Oversight and Monitoring 
a.  The Legal Framework: Is the Framework Evolving?  
Corporate directors can be held personally liable for “an 
unconsidered failure . . . to act in circumstances in which due 
attention would . . . have prevented [a] loss.”17  Thus pronounced the 
Delaware Court of Chancery in In re Caremark International Inc. 
Derivative Litigation.18  Caremark is generally viewed as having set 
forth not only a narrow, fiduciary-protective standard of review 
(“bad faith”) but also an expanded scope of fiduciary oversight 
responsibility.19  The court enlarged the scope of director 
responsibility beyond the more minimalist “red flag” test of Graham 
v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.20  The Caremark opinion 
endorsed information and reporting systems and controls as 
 15. See, e.g., Nicholas DiMascio, Note, Credit Where Credit Is Due: The 
Legal Treatment of Early Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reductions, 56 DUKE L.J. 
1587, 1587–90 (2007). 
 16. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.c. 
 17. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 
1996) (emphasis omitted). 
 18. Id. 
 19. See CORPORATE LAW STORIES 331–46 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009). 
 20. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 129–31 (Del. 
1963); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley: 
Revisiting Corporate Law’s “Duty of Care as Responsibility for Systems,” 31 J. 
CORP. L. 949, 953 (2006); Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith, 
32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719, 752–53 (2007). 
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oversight tools (and defenses).21
Nevertheless, liability in any particular instance is not a given: 
“[O]nly a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise 
oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a 
reasonable information and reporting system exists—will establish 
the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability.”22  A 
claim of this type, therefore, is “possibly the most difficult theory in 
corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a 
judgment.”23
The Delaware Supreme Court, in Stone v. Ritter, approved the 
chancery court’s Caremark decision, including the latter court’s 
endorsement of information and reporting systems.24  The Stone 
court held that such a “conscious disregard for their responsibilities” 
of oversight and monitoring amounts to a breach of the directors’ 
duty of loyalty, at least to the extent they did not act in “good 
faith.”25  In such instances, as other courts have noted, the directors 
must have been “conscious of the fact that they were not doing their 
jobs.”26  They must have acted with “bad faith—because their 
indolence was so persistent.”27
Notwithstanding these difficulties of pleading and proof posed 
by the law governing a claim of oversight failure, some 
commentators have wondered whether certain developments over 
the years may cause courts to hold directors to a higher level of 
scrutiny: 
(1) The Caremark court itself noted the Delaware courts’ 
increasing emphasis on the importance of the board function,28 
commented that the requirement of a fully informed board is so 
basic as to be “elementary,”29 and spoke approvingly of the emphasis 
on corporate information and reporting systems in the federal 
sentencing guidelines.30
(2) The impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) increased the 
scrutiny on public companies and their fiduciaries.  While 
technically, of course, SOX is federal law, many perceive a follow-on 
effect at the state-court level—as Caremark itself 
illustrates/symbolizes.31
 21. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 969–70. 
 22. Id. at 971. 
 23. Id. at 967. 
 24. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006). 
 25. Id. at 370. 
 26. Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 27. Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 935 (Del. Ch. 2007); see also In re 
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006). 
 28. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970 (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 
(Del. 1985); Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. (In re Paramount 
Commc’ns Inc. S’holders’ Litig.), 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994)). 
 29. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970. 
 30. Id. at 969–70. 
 31. See Marc Gunther, Boards Beware!, FORTUNE, Nov. 10, 2003, at 171, 
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(3) Numerous experts believe that “[i]n the context of the 
current global financial crisis and the swooning global 
economy . . . boards and companies must be mindful of the 
possibility that courts will apply new standards, or interpret 
existing standards, to increase board responsibility for risk 
management.”32
The following discussion considers both factual and legal 
considerations in analyzing the fiduciary duty to respond to climate-
change business risks. 
b.  Monitoring GHG Impacts and Regulatory Developments: 
What Facts and Events Could Trigger a Duty of Oversight?  And Is 
Corporate Law Really Evolving?  Recent Delaware case law hardly 
bodes well for the prospect that the courts will be driving strict 
corporate-governance oversight of climate-change business risks.  In 
re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation aptly supports 
this point.33
In Citigroup, shareholders sued derivatively, charging certain 
current and former directors and officers with failure to perform 
their oversight and management duties relative to the company’s 
involvement in the subprime-mortgage market.  The company’s 
dealings in complex financial instruments through its Securities & 
Banking Unit had led to significant losses that in turn plunged the 
company into financial crisis.34
The plaintiffs asserted that the fiduciaries should have acted in 
the face of several “red flags” that posed significant business risk.  
These included (1) specific, negative developments in the housing 
and subprime-credit markets, (2) predictions of doom in these 
markets by eminent experts such as economist Paul Krugman and 
organizations such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board, 
(3) specific instances of substantial distress or failure on the part of 
firms engaged in similar market activities, and (4) specific instances 
of substantial distress or failure of financial derivative instruments 
linked to those markets.35
In ruling on the defendants’ motion to dismiss the derivative 
176 (“It would not be unreasonable to assume that the Delaware courts are 
responding to the Enron and WorldCom headlines and the intrusion, so to 
speak, of the federal government into the internal governance of corporations.” 
(quoting former Delaware Chancellor William Allen)); see also Lisa M. Fairfax, 
Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary Duty 
Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 415–20 (2005) (“[T]here is 
evidence that Sarbanes-Oxley may play a role in increasing director liability by 
altering the manner in which state courts view exculpatory statutes.”). 
 32. Martin Lipton et al., Risk Management and the Board of Directors, 42 
BANK & CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REP. 150, 150 (2009). 
 33. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 
2009). 
 34. Id. at 111–15. 
 35. Id. at 114–15, 127. 
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suit, the court was not kind to the plaintiffs.  First, and especially 
pertinent to climate-change issues, the court took a dim view of 
“business risk” as a suitable triggering context for fiduciary 
responsibility.  Caremark and Stone, observed the court, involved 
losses deriving from serious employee misconduct or corporate 
violations of law, not from business risk.36  The court opined: 
To the extent the Court allows shareholder plaintiffs to 
succeed on a theory that a director is liable for a failure to 
monitor business risk, the Court risks undermining the well 
settled policy of Delaware law by inviting Courts to perform a 
hindsight evaluation of the reasonableness or prudence of 
directors’ business decisions.37
In elucidating this duty, did the Caremark court and the others 
referred to in Citigroup focus largely on serious employee 
misconduct and corporate violations of law simply because this was 
the factual context of those cases?  Did Caremark actually 
contemplate a broader scope of responsibility, one embracing 
business risk as well as violations of law?  For example, the 
Caremark court spoke of the need for directors to be sufficiently 
knowledgeable that they can “reach informed judgments concerning 
both the corporation’s compliance with law and its business 
performance.”38  Is this what the Citigroup court had in mind when 
it observed that “it may be possible for a plaintiff to meet the burden 
under some set of facts”?39
At least technically, the Citigroup and Caremark courts allowed 
that a plaintiff could successfully demonstrate a culpable failure to 
monitor business risk “under some set of facts.”  On the other hand, 
the Citigroup court’s main message was largely in the negative, to 
the point of describing business risk as “fundamentally different” 
from employee misconduct and legal violations.40
Essentially, the Citigroup court conflated the duty-of-
care/business-judgment-rule analysis with the duty-of-loyalty/bad-
faith analysis.  Characterizing the case as actually a duty-of-care 
case, although analyzing the matter under both duties, the court 
talked largely about business-judgment “decisions” and business 
 36. Id. at 123–24. 
 37. Id. at 126.  The court’s discussion of the business judgment rule and the 
duty of oversight together reflected its view that “one can see a similarity 
between the standard for assessing oversight liability and the standard for 
assessing a disinterested director’s decision under the duty of care when [as 
here] the company has adopted an exculpatory provision pursuant to § 
102(b)(7).”  Id. at 125. 
 38. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 
1996) (emphasis added). 
 39. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 126 (emphasis added). 
 40. Id. at 131. 
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risk.41  In this regard, the judicial-restraint rationale of the business 
judgment rule predominated in the discussion.  This meant that 
imposing liability based on a failure to monitor business risk would 
undermine the purposes of the business judgment rule in protecting 
the type of risk taking that lies at the heart of the free-enterprise 
system.42  Delaware law was not meant to make directors liable for 
“failure to predict the future and to properly evaluate business 
risk.”43  At best, the court’s acknowledgement of the possibility of 
demonstrating a culpable failure by directors to monitor business 
risk was noncommittal and skeptical. 
If fiduciary liability is possible, in theory at least, the Citigroup 
court gave no explicit positive guidance about what facts would 
support a successful claim.  Identifying what the court said the 
plaintiffs did wrong and what the company’s directors did right, 
however, is a logical place to start. 
For example, the court characterized the plaintiffs’ allegations 
as insufficient in that they were “conclusory” and not 
“particularized.”44  They “[did] not even specify how the board’s 
oversight mechanisms were inadequate or how the director 
defendants knew of these inadequacies and consciously ignored 
them.”45  It also appeared to be significant that “Citigroup had 
procedures and controls in place that were designed to monitor 
risk,” with a rather active and engaged committee that worked with 
management and key outside advisers.46
Without express guidance, it is not discernible whether 
establishing procedures and controls directed by an active and 
engaged committee would be an indispensable requirement or 
merely a factor to consider.  But a prudent board seeking to avoid 
adverse legal consequences in the future would do well to consider 
establishing a similar arrangement as the GHG regulatory web 
becomes more complete or as physical impacts of climate change 
become more specific and substantive. 
2. Fiduciary Duty and Decision Making About Climate 
Change 
a.  The Legal Framework.  The fiduciary duty of oversight is 
typically distinguished from the fiduciary duty of care on the basis, 
among other things, that the latter controls liability for “decisions” 
 41. See id. at 123–31. 
 42. Id. at 130–31. 
 43. Id. at 131. 
 44. Id. at 127.  The court also noted that American International Group, 
Inc., v. Greenberg (In re American International Group, Inc., Consolidated 
Derivative Litigation), 965 A.2d 763 (Del. Ch. 2009), provided a “stark contrast” 
between the allegations presented in Citigroup and allegations that are 
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.  Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 130. 
 45. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 128. 
 46. Id. at 127. 
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made by a board.  Directors are protected from liability for such 
decisions by the process-oriented business judgment rule47—a 
“presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the 
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the 
company.”48
b. Applicability. 
  i.  Decisions Whether to Take Strategic Action on Climate 
Change.  The basic approach of the business judgment rule, focusing 
on the decision makers’ process rather than the substance of their 
decision, provides considerable discretion.  In that sense, directors, 
to the extent they use a rational, informed decisional process, may 
pretty much take (or not take) whatever action they choose 
regarding corporate policy and practice on climate change. 
Perhaps the most revealing language about the attitude of the 
Delaware courts on the subject comes from Caremark: 
[W]hether a judge or jury considering the matter after the fact, 
believes a decision substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong 
extending through “stupid” to “egregious” or “irrational”, 
provides no ground for director liability, so long as the court 
determines that the process employed was either rational or 
employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate 
interests.49
Though strongly worded, this expression does not exaggerate the 
scope of discretion accorded fiduciaries.50
  ii.  Must Companies Adopt “Best Practices”?  Environmental 
advocates, along with corporations taking a proactive leadership 
posture on climate change, typically urge corporate adoption of high-
quality standards of GHG management.  They note the competitive 
advantages and reputational benefits of such a practice, and they 
believe that, in the long term, the benefits will far outpace the initial 
and ongoing costs.51
On the other hand, many corporate leaders and policymakers 
balk at this notion, defending their position on the ground that the 
 47. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967–68 (Del. 
Ch. 1996) (“[T]he business judgment rule is process oriented and informed by a 
deep respect for all good faith board decisions.”). 
 48. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
 49. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967. 
 50. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31 cmt. note on directors’ liability 4 
(2007). 
 51. See Steven Mufson, Push to Reduce Greenhouse Gases Would Put a 
Price on Emitting Pollution, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2009, at D1 (describing 
competing views about imminent legislation on climate change). 
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increased costs related to achieving such a high standard entail 
significant negative consequences.  They assert that these harmful 
consequences would occur at company-specific, industry-sector, and 
ultimately macroeconomic levels.  Further, they would add, the huge 
capital investments required initially could turn out to be 
inappropriate when the ultimate comprehensive regulatory scheme 
is established.52
State corporate law, because of the considerable discretion 
accorded to directors, does not require that they adopt best practices 
for GHG management.  As the Delaware Supreme Court stated in 
Brehm v. Eisner: 
Aspirational ideals of good corporate governance practices for 
boards of directors that go beyond the minimal legal 
requirements of the corporation law are highly desirable, often 
tend to benefit stockholders, sometimes reduce litigation and 
can usually help directors avoid liability.  But they are not 
required by the corporation law and do not define standards of 
liability.53
Hence, state corporate law, in the absence of positive climate 
regulation, is not really an actor in the debate and discussion about 
climate-change strategy.  Corporate planners should, however, 
monitor emerging law carefully, as best-practices standards are 
virtually always among the proposed regulatory models. 
  iii.  Would Adoption of Best Practices Violate Fiduciary 
Duties?  While the question remains whether fiduciary-duty law, 
unaccompanied by any legal-compliance strictures, requires 
directors to adopt best-practices standards, proactive adoption of 
such standards would not appear to be a real problem. 
A shareholder complaining about adoption of (presumably more 
costly) best-practices standards might claim that directors caused 
the company to “waste” corporate resources.  “To prevail on a waste 
claim . . . the plaintiff must overcome the general presumption of 
good faith by showing that the board’s decision was so egregious or 
irrational that it could not have been based on a valid assessment of 
the corporation’s best interests.”54
Following this standard, the Citigroup court dismissed the 
plaintiffs’ waste claims based on the company’s subprime-related 
investments, noting that “[t]he test to show corporate waste is 
difficult for any plaintiff to meet.”55  On this analysis, given that a 
 52. See id. 
 53. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000) (emphasis added), 
quoted in In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 745 n.399 (Del. 
Ch. 2005). 
 54. White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 554 n.36 (Del. 2001). 
 55. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 136 (Del. 
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corporate strategic decision in favor of a more costly, higher GHG-
management model would likely be the result of a thorough and 
considered process, fiduciaries should not be in danger of incurring 
personal liability.56 
B. Securities Law 
Assertions that state corporate law applies to climate change 
also have counterparts in federal securities law.  But unlike the 
views about state law, those about federal securities law and climate 
change tend to be the subject of major initiatives.  These initiatives 
aim to pressure public companies into making more forthcoming 
disclosures to the federal Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) and to the public. 
The discussion below describes several prominent initiatives, 
analyzes specific, potentially applicable disclosure provisions, and 
then speculates about the future disclosure environment.  Important 
here is the fact that advocates are not just seeking immediate action 
by public companies.  They are also attempting to influence and 
shape legal interpretations of existing law in their favor.  While 
strikingly few companies are currently making disclosures, these 
initiatives, combined with evolving knowledge and values about 
climate change, will gradually create a quite different legal culture 
for affected companies. 
1. Major Initiatives to Increase SEC Disclosure About Climate 
Change 
a.  Legal Actions by the New York Attorney General: The Xcel 
and Dynegy Settlements.  In September 2007, New York Attorney 
General (“NYAG”) Andrew M. Cuomo initiated an inquiry, pursuant 
to Executive Law Section 63 and General Business Law Section 
352,57 centering on the Xcel Energy (Xcel) and Dynegy companies, 
among others.  The Xcel inquiry concerned the adequacy of the 
company’s disclosures to investors, including in its SEC filings, on 
the “expected impact of climate change and the regulation of [GHG] 
emissions on Xcel Energy’s operations, financial condition, and 
plans to construct a new coal-fired electric generating unit.”58  The 
Ch. 2009).  See generally id. at 135–38 (analyzing plaintiffs’ waste claims). 
 56. See generally PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 (1994); William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic 
Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 264–77 (1992). 
 57. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63 (McKinney 2002) sets forth the general duties of 
the New York Attorney General and includes subsection 15, which provides 
authority to accept “assurances of discontinuance” in settlement of matters 
initiated by the Attorney General.  N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352 (McKinney 1996) 
provides certain authority to the Attorney General with respect to the 
investigation of “fraudulent practices in respect to stocks, bonds and other 
securities.” 
 58. Assurance of Discontinuance Pursuant to Executive Law § 63(15), In re 
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Dynegy inquiry was similar.59
Xcel and Dynegy ultimately agreed to settle, without admitting 
or denying any violation of law or wrongdoing, by agreeing to 
expand or continue relevant disclosures made in their annual Form 
10-K filings with the SEC.60  The four-year Xcel agreement (Xcel 
Discontinuance) and the four-year Dynegy agreement (Dynegy 
Discontinuance) both included the following disclosure 
requirements: 
(1) Analysis of Financial Risks from Regulation (present and 
probable future laws regulating GHG emissions).61
(2) Analysis of Financial Risks from Litigation (“any” climate-
change litigation that will “likely” have a “material financial effect” 
on the company).62
(3) Analysis of Financial Risks from Physical Impacts of Climate 
Change (including “increase[s] in sea level and changes in weather 
conditions, such as increases in extreme weather events, changes in 
precipitation resulting in drought or water shortages, and changes 
in temperature”).63
(4) Strategic Analysis of Climate-Change Risk and Emissions 
Management (extensive disclosure regarding the company’s position 
on climate change, GHG emissions data, management strategies 
and practices (and their results and expected future effects), and 
relevant corporate-governance policies and practices).64
From the wording of the Xcel Discontinuance, Xcel may have 
been suspected of disclosing significantly less about climate-change 
matters in its SEC disclosures than in its voluntary disclosures.  For 
example, the Xcel Discontinuance noted particularly the disclosures 
the company made in response to a 2006 questionnaire from the 
Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) and in other non-SEC disclosures.65
Indeed, those disclosures provided information that essentially 
framed the nature and scope of the NYAG’s inquiry.66  After the 
Xcel Energy Inc., AOD # 08-012, at 1 (Aug. 26, 2008), available at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2008/aug/xcel_aod.pdf [hereinafter 
Xcel Discontinuance]. 
 59. See Assurance of Discontinuance Pursuant to Executive Law § 63(15), 
In re Dynegy Inc., AOD # 08-132, at 1 (Oct. 23, 2008), available at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2008/oct/dynegy_aod.pdf [hereinafter 
Dynegy Discontinuance]. 
 60. Id. at 2–5; Xcel Discontinuance, supra note 58, at 2–5. 
 61. Dynegy Discontinuance, supra note 59, at 3; Xcel Discontinuance, supra 
note 58, at 3. 
 62. Dynegy Discontinuance, supra note 59, at 3; Xcel Discontinuance, supra 
note 58, at 3–4. 
 63. Dynegy Discontinuance, supra note 59, at 3–4; Xcel Discontinuance, 
supra note 58, at 4. 
 64. Dynegy Discontinuance, supra note 59, at 4–5; Xcel Discontinuance, 
supra note 58, at 4–5. 
 65.  Xcel Discontinuance, supra note 58, at 1–2. 
 66. Compare id. at 1 (discussing, in paragraph A, the nature and scope of 
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NYAG’s initial intervention, Xcel “provided more detailed 
information about climate change risk in its SEC filings than in 
previous filings.”67  The Xcel Discontinuance memorialized the 
parties’ ultimate agreement about appropriate disclosures. 
In this regard, the NYAG’s inquiry may have been addressing a 
typical pattern that has emerged in recent years.  That is, many 
companies reap the reputational benefits of appearing enthusiastic 
and forthcoming about climate change in voluntary settings.  But 
those same companies may become discernibly more restrictive in 
their SEC disclosures—wherein, of course, fuller disclosure could 
have adverse market and liability potential. 
This practice is apparently widespread.  For example, it was 
described in a review of SEC and other disclosure practices by the 
law firm McGuireWoods LLP.68  The firm reviewed the 2008 10-K 
filings of approximately 350 companies included in the S&P 500, 
S&P MidCap 400, and S&P SmallCap 600 indices across all ten 
industry sectors represented in these indices.  First, generally, the 
review found that “very few companies outside the energy and 
utility industries were making any type of climate 
change . . . disclosures in their SEC reports.”69  And as to disparate 
disclosures, it appears that in non-SEC venues many companies go 
as far as identifying climate change as posing “commercial risk,” 
having a “likelihood of ‘significant impact,’” or being a “potential 
material risk.”  Yet these same companies’ SEC disclosures do not 
address these critical, obviously “material” subjects.70
Initiatives such as those of the NYAG put pressure on 
companies to make fuller SEC disclosures.  This is obvious from the 
considerable publicity accompanying them.  For example, NYAG 
Cuomo announced the Dynegy settlement at a press conference 
joined by former U.S. Vice President Al Gore.  The settlement, 
Cuomo said, will help “protect investors by ensuring disclosure of 
potential financial risks that climate change may pose . . . [and will] 
raise the bar in the industry.”71
 
the NYAG’s inquiry), with id. at 2 (using identical language, in paragraph E, to 
describe the information disclosed by Xcel to the CDP and in other non-SEC 
disclosures). 
 67. Id. at 2. 
 68. JANE WHITT SELLERS ET AL., MCGUIREWOODS LLP, CLIMATE CHANGE 
DISCLOSURE: OUT WITH THE OLD; IN WITH THE NEW? (2009), 
http://www.mcguirewoods.com/news-resources/publications/climate%20change 
%20disclosure.pdf. 
 69. Id. at 1. 
 70. Id. at 8. 
 71. Press Release, Office of the Attorney Gen. of N.Y., Attorney General 
Cuomo, Joined by Vice President Gore, Announces Agreement with Major 
Energy Company, Dynegy, Inc. (Oct. 23, 2008) (emphasis added), available at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2008/oct/oct23a_08.html. 
 770 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 
 
b.  SEC Petition.  On September 18, 2007, a coalition of 
nongovernmental organizations, state governmental officials and 
entities (including state treasurers, comptrollers, and state 
retirement pension funds), and others filed a petition with the SEC 
entitled Petition for Interpretive Guidance on Climate Risk 
Disclosure (“SEC Petition”).72  The SEC Petition “request[ed] that 
the [SEC] issue an interpretive release clarifying that material 
climate-related information must be included in corporate 
disclosures under existing law.”73  Notably, the SEC Petition sought 
an “interpretation” of “existing law,” thus reflecting the petitioners’ 
position that present law was a sufficient basis for requiring the 
desired climate-risk disclosures and no new laws were necessary.  
Accordingly, the petitioners used this position as the basis for the 
following points: 
(1) Current law requires public companies to disclose material 
information about climate risk.74
(2) The changing regulatory and physical environments related 
to climate change are creating significant business risks for 
public companies.75
(3) Climate risk is increasingly important to investors.76
(4) Currently, climate risk is not being adequately disclosed.77
(5) The SEC should clarify corporate obligations to disclose 
climate risk.78
The NYAG settlements and the SEC Petition reflect substantial 
advocacy by major actors.  Certainly, the power wielded by these 
actors, which is both political and economic, will weigh heavily on 
the state of emerging attitudes, policies, and practices on climate 
change in the corporate sector.  From a legal standpoint, however, 
the question whether federal securities law, by itself, compels the 
sought-after action has not been decided authoritatively.  The 
following discussion offers some pertinent points for any analysis 
leading to such a decision. 
2. Analysis of Pertinent Provisions 
The SEC Petition identified several SEC disclosure provisions 
that typically arise in discussions about climate change.  In most of 
 72. SEC Petition, supra note 12.  On June 12, 2008, the petitioners made a 
supplemental filing with the SEC, reporting on recent developments pertinent 
to the original petition.  Letter from Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. et al., to 
Florence E. Harmon, Acting Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (June 12, 2008), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2008/petn4-547-supp.pdf. 
 73. SEC Petition, supra note 12, at 2. 
 74. Id. at 13–21. 
 75. Id. at 21–34. 
 76. Id. at 34–44. 
 77. Id. at 45–51. 
 78. Id. at 51–56. 
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these provisions, whether disclosure is required depends on the 
extent to which a climate-change impact is sufficiently specific, 
certain, and substantial to be important to investors.  A close look 
reveals that increased certainty about climate change—particularly 
as reflected in express statements by some companies—may be 
increasing the prospect that disclosure is legally required in certain 
instances.  In other situations, however, a substantial burden 
remains to demonstrate the presence of sufficient specificity, 
certainty, and substantiality to trigger legal disclosure 
requirements. 
a.  Accounting for Contingencies (Under Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (“FASB”) Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 5).  Accrual of a loss contingency for financial-
statement purposes depends on whether a liability or asset 
impairment is “probable” and the amount of the loss can be 
“reasonably estimated.”79  To the extent the facts warrant it, 
climate-related liabilities or asset impairments may arise as a result 
of (1) violation of, or required compliance with, an existing climate-
change law; (2) damage to someone else’s property, such as damage 
because of weather-related climate-change events; (3) obligations 
triggered by climate-change events, such as  company obligations 
based on insurance, guaranty, or other hedging transactions; or (4) 
damage to a company’s own property by climate-influenced weather 
events.80
The challenge for this disclosure requirement is similar to that 
for litigation disclosure, in that such elements as materiality, 
damages, and causation (including specific demonstration and 
attribution to the company) remain problematic in many instances.81
b.  Description of Business (Under Item 101 of SEC Regulation 
S-K).  Item 101 would require disclosure of the “material effects” 
that compliance with environmental law “may have upon the 
[company’s] capital expenditures, earnings and competitive position” 
as well as disclosure of “any material estimated capital expenditures 
for environmental control facilities for the remainder of its current 
fiscal year and its succeeding fiscal year and for such further periods 
as the registrant may deem material[].”82
Obviously, once a valid regulatory measure exists, as is true in 
an increasing number of cities, states, and countries, disclosure is 
 79. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS: ORIGINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS, Statement of Fin. 
Accounting Standards No. 5, para. 8 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2004).  To 
be “probable,” an event must be “likely to occur.”  Id. para. 3(a).  Even where the 
test for accrual is not met, disclosure in the financial-statement notes may be 
required.  Id. paras. 9–12. 
 80. See id. para. 4. 
 81. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.c. 
 82. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(xii) (2008). 
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required. 
c.  Legal Proceedings (Under Item 103 of SEC Regulation S-K).  
Item 103 of Regulation S-K requires disclosure by public companies 
of major legal proceedings that could have a significant financial 
impact on the company.83  The provision applies to major 
environmental proceedings.84
“Materiality” and the size of the potential financial impact are 
the formal elements in a company’s analysis here.  Pivotal in that 
analysis—and a typical weak link in climate-change litigation cases, 
both in regard to standing and on the merits—is the question of 
causation.  Accordingly, a company may take the position that 
disclosure of pending climate-change litigation is unwarranted 
because a tenuous basis of causation makes a victory on the merits 
unlikely.  Alternatively, a company may disclose the litigation but 
then characterize it as weak. 
Notwithstanding the increased activity and prominence in the 
area of climate-change litigation, it has been said that “[g]auging the 
prospects of . . . pending climate change [litigation] is a precarious 
venture.”85  Thus observed a report prepared by the Congressional 
Research Service entitled Climate Change Litigation: A Growing 
Phenomenon (“CRS Report”).  The CRS Report notes further: 
In the conventional sense of the term, plaintiffs’ successes 
have been rare in cases seeking relief directly from GHG 
emitters.  A court may be reluctant to impose expensive 
measures to address a global problem on a defendant that is a 
proportionately minor contributor (which almost all 
defendants are, given the vast number of GHG emitters), using 
statutory provisions or common law principles that were not 
formulated with global problems in mind, against a backdrop 
of scientific uncertainty as to the precise consequences (if not 
the general cause) of climate change.86
As noted earlier, causation is often a major problem, whether in 
the context of legal standing or the merits.  An “intractable problem 
in environmental law [generally has been convincing courts to 
impose] liability for harms that are remote in time and place from 
the pollution sought to be abated, particularly where the pollution 
comes from multiple sources.”87
 83. Id. § 229.103 (requiring disclosure of “material pending legal 
proceedings, other than ordinary routine litigation incidental to the business”). 
 84. Id. § 229.103 instruction 5. 
 85. ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: A 
GROWING PHENOMENON 33 (2008), available at http://www.communityrights.org/ 
PDFs/Warming%20Law/CRS_4_7_08.pdf. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 34; see RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
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In contrast to the previous genre of cases, pro-environmental 
litigation seeking governmental remedies has tended to be more 
successful.  “In a much-publicized string of 2007 decisions under the 
Clean Air Act, Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, foreign 
policy authority of the United States, and [the National 
Environmental Policy Act], courts have shown increased willingness 
to authorize or require government consideration of climate 
change.”88  From a corporate perspective, these victories can have 
potentially significant impacts. 
For example, in Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. 
Department of the Interior, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia vacated a five-year federal Interior Department oil- and 
gas-leasing program for failure of the government to consider 
environmental impacts properly.89  And although the court 
remanded the case to the agency for proper environmental 
analysis,90 and probably ultimate completion of the program, 
potential business lessees suffer from costs related to the delay.  
Additionally, the plaintiffs could well exacerbate the delay through 
continued litigation initiatives. 
d.  Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial 
Condition and Results of Operations (Under Item 303 of SEC 
Regulation S-K).91  The overall objective of the Management’s 
Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of 
Operations (“MD&A”) is well reflected in its title.  It is to give 
investors “an opportunity to look at the [company] through the eyes 
of management by providing a historical and prospective analysis of 
the [company’s] financial condition and results of operations.”92  This 
objective, especially given the MD&A’s “particular emphasis on the 
[company’s] prospects for the future,”93 makes it perhaps the most 
potent climate-change disclosure provision at this juncture.  What 
5–15 (2004); see also Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 
563 F.3d 466, 478 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“Petitioners’ substantive theory of standing 
[to sue about climate-change impacts] fails because [they] have not established 
either the injury or causation element . . . .”). 
 88. MELTZ, supra note 85, at 33–34  (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 
497 (2007); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 
508 F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 2007); Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 
F. Supp. 2d 1151 (E.D. Cal. 2007); Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge 
Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D. Vt. 2007)). 
 89. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 563 F.3d at 
489. 
 90. Id. 
 91. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2008). 
 92. Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and 
Results of Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Securities Act 
Release No. 6835, Exchange Act Release No. 26,831, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 16,961, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427, 22,436 (May 24, 1989). 
 93. Id. 
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remains to be seen is whether the SEC will choose to require 
companies to live up to the express language of the provision, as 
well as the SEC’s own interpretations of it, on climate-change 
matters. 
More specifically, in the MD&A, companies “must identify and 
disclose known trends, events, demands, commitments and 
uncertainties that are reasonably likely to have a material effect on 
financial condition or operating performance.”94  Moreover, “forward 
looking information is required where there are known trends [or] 
uncertainties . . . that are reasonably likely to result in . . . a 
material impact on the company’s liquidity, capital resources, 
revenues and results of operations.”95
That this provision applies to “business risk” as much as legal 
compliance is clear from its language.  Additionally, this fact was 
affirmed early on by the SEC in Caterpillar Inc.96  In Caterpillar, the 
SEC found that the company had failed to make disclosures about 
events deriving from economic policy changes that could in the 
future have a material negative financial impact on the consolidated 
company. 
In 1989, the company’s Brazilian subsidiary, CBSA, had 
reported disproportionately high net profits (compared to other 
subsidiaries).  But a significant component of those net profits 
consisted of nonoperating items tied directly to Brazil’s troubled 
economic environment.97  When Brazil’s new president “immediately 
instituted sweeping economic and monetary changes,” Caterpillar 
failed to disclose this development and its implications.98  The SEC 
concluded that Caterpillar’s disclosures “should have discussed the 
future uncertainties regarding CBSA’s operations, the possible risk 
of Caterpillar having materially lower earnings as a result of that 
risk and, to the extent reasonably practicable, quantified the impact 
of such risk.”99
The SEC Petition expresses the view that “information about 
the scope of the challenges climate change poses to a specific 
company, and whether its management is adequately prepared to 
face those challenges, is precisely the type of information that the 
 94. Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Discussion and 
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, Securities Act 
Release No. 8350, Exchange Act Release No. 48,960, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,056, 75,057 
(Dec. 29, 2003) (emphasis added). 
 95. DIV. OF CORP. FIN., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SUMMARY BY THE DIVISION 
OF CORPORATION FINANCE OF SIGNIFICANT ISSUES ADDRESSED IN THE REVIEW OF 
THE PERIODIC REPORTS OF THE FORTUNE 500 COMPANIES (2003), 
www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/fortune500rep.htm. 
 96. See Caterpillar Inc., 50 S.E.C. 903, 912 (1992). 
 97. Id. at 904. 
 98. Id. at 905–08. 
 99. Id. at 912. 
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market is now demanding about climate risk.”100  The SEC’s view 
appears to be similar, at least in general, when it observes that 
companies “should identify and discuss key performance indicators, 
including non-financial performance indicators, that their 
management uses to manage the business and that would be 
material to investors.”101  Thus, the language of the MD&A is clear, 
and so are the SEC’s interpretations of it.  When the SEC and the 
courts begin to consider the question of climate-change disclosure in 
SEC filings, MD&A disclosure will probably be the most difficult one 
to reject. 
3. Implications for Corporate Strategic Planning 
As to the applicability of the securities laws to climate change, 
the discussion above suggests that specific disclosure provisions may 
or may not be relevant at this time.  Over time, more of these 
provisions will likely become applicable.  But the real question is 
what attitude the SEC and the courts will take about disclosure. 
To the extent that they approach cases with a healthy but 
inquiring skepticism, they will probably chart a gradual course 
toward increasingly demanding disclosure.  But if the ignorance and 
unfounded skepticism about climate change that have hamstrung 
progress in this area for many years carries the day, those asserting 
claims will meet with real difficulty.  A more rational consideration 
that may play a role, whether or not it is expressly articulated, is 
the quite legitimate concern about the economic impact of corporate 
action.  Always an element in the debate and discussion, and 
frequently only a mere political stratagem, this concern looms even 
larger than ever during the present global economic and financial 
crisis. 
Yet it is not this latter scenario of reluctance in legal 
enforcement that will determine the future of corporate climate-
change strategy.  To the contrary, an influential community of 
advocates, boosted by an ever-growing consensus about the need for 
action, will continue its leadership role in setting the ground rules 
for corporate policies and practices in this area.  Securities law, by 
contrast, will likely have an increasingly greater impact on 
corporate action, but how much so will depend on the political will of 
government and the advocacy of plaintiffs.  The “take away” 
message for the corporate community, therefore, is that it should 
prepare for a new world of demanding climate-change standards, 
whatever the source of the pressure animating the change. 
 100. SEC Petition, supra note 12, at 18. 
 101. Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Discussion and 
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, Securities Act 
Release No. 8350, Exchange Act Release No. 48,960, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,056, 75,057 
(Dec. 29, 2003). 
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CONCLUSION 
Climate change has emerged as an important consideration in 
corporate planning today, and its profile appears likely to increase.  
Because of its potential adverse impacts on companies, whether 
through physical phenomena, regulation, or litigation, corporate 
planners are being forced to act. 
Whether corporate and securities law will play a role in this 
emerging drama remains to be seen.  The analysis in this Article 
points to a minimal likelihood of state corporate-law significance in 
the near future.  Federal securities law—because of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, and perhaps boosted by substantial advocacy and 
reactions to the present financial crisis—is likely to play a much 
greater role.  In the meantime, nonlegal forces, emanating from 
politics, economics, and advocacy-driven public consciousness, will 
provide the main impetus for corporate action. 
 
 
